History of the Special Forces and Special Operation Forces
 

The Assault on Saint Nazaire

The assault on Saint Nazaire, by British Army Commandos, on the coast of France (Atlantic coast) is to be considered to be the greatest sea borne raid of World War II.

The port lies in the mouth of the Loire and had been a major target for the British, since the occupation of France. It did not only contain the largest dry dock (at that time) of the world, it was also one of the ,most important U-Boat bases for the battle of the Atlantic.

On 23 March 1942, a raid was mounted on the dry dock at Saint Nazaire. Before the Tirpitz, and other German capital ships, could be deployed against the Allied shipping life-line to the USA and Canada, they needed dry-dock facilities on the Atlantic coast. The only port capable of handling these large ships was St. Nazaire on the River Loire estuary. Denying the Germans the use of the dry-dock at St. Nazaire would effectively neutralize the threat posed by these formidable fighting ships. In the raid HMS Cambeltown was packed with high explosives, ran the gauntlet of intensive German gun fire and rammed into the gates of the dry dock. The losses from those on board, and in accompanying vessels, was high but it was a supremely successful operation. The damage to the dry dock was not made good until after the war. No.4 Commando provided volunteers for the demolition parties.

The outline plan was simple. The selected vessel, packed with high explosives in the bow, with troops and crew in protected areas, would ram the outer lock gate at speed and stick there. They would disembark and take cover behind a nearby air-raid shelter. The ship would then blow up destroying the gate. An MTB would then pass through and fire specially designed torpedoes at the inner gate which would collapse under pressure when the tide went out damaging the submarines berthed in their protected pens. The troops and crew would then destroy as many dockyard targets and withdraw in fast motor launches which had followed them in. All this was to be achieved under cover of an air raid.

The planners themselves had doubts about the withdrawal phase. There were likely to be unknown and variable factors that could not be planned for but the risks were less than the potential rewards. However outside the planning circle there were those, notably the Naval C in C Plymouth, who thought the vessel would bounce off the gate. He held to his view even against the advice of the engineer who built it. He also thought that anyone within half a mile of the explosion would be killed.
Mountbatten conceded the point about the destructive power of the explosion and delayed action fuses were to be fitted to allow time for the troops and crew to evacuate the area. However on the question of the use of a boat to ram the lock gate he held firm. A further concession was to spread the raiding force between the main ship and the supporting motor launches simply to avoid total loss of the force in the event of disaster befalling the main ship.
The raid was to be led by HMS Campbeltown, an American lend-lease destroyer (USS Buchanan). It was especially refitted for the task. Her interior was stripped, the bridge armour-plated, and additional protection provided for the Commandos she would carry. The accompanying motor launches (MLs) were tocarry 150 Commandos. The boats were fitted with two Oerlikon 20mm guns and additional fuel tanks to increase their range. As the needs of the raid were reassessed, the ML fleet was firstly increased to ten and then to 14. Only one motor gun boat (MGB) was available - MGB 314, a C-Class Fairmile, commanded by Lt. Dunstan Curtis. She would lead the attack and in reserve there would be motor torpedo boat (MTB) 74. This was equipped with unproven flying torpedoes to breach the dry dock gates if the Campbeltown failed to reach the target.

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01 ACTION

The fleet sailed from Falmouth at 3 pm on the 26th of March with MGB 314 at the head and two escort destroyers flanking the MLs and HMS Campbeltown. South west of Ushant they came across a U-Boat and damaged it. They left the area of action on a false course which the submarine duly reported to their command and control HQ. Five German torpedo boats were sent from St Nazaire to engage the vessels but in entirely the wrong direction. They were still at sea during the period of the raid. Around midnight on the 26th/27th March the raiders saw bomb flashes and tracers light the sky. The diversionary bombing air raid had started but low cloud rendered it inaccurate which caused an alert in the town and its approaches rather than the intended effect of keeping the German forces in their bunkers. The bombers had been briefed to target only specific military installations to avoid civilian casualties. Those who failed to acquire their targets did not drop their bombs.

Each boat flew the German flag to confuse the enemy and delay identification. HMS Sturgeon, a submarine, provided the exact position for the task force from which to make its run into the estuary. The Campbeltown crept through at 5 knots, touching bottom twice. At 0120 hours search lights illuminated the entire fleet but, for a short time, the Germans were reluctant to open fire possibly because of confusion caused by spoof signals and a general disbelief amongst and the German that such an audacious raid could be undertaken. The German flags were replaced with the White Ensign when the fleet was still two miles from its target. The Germans opened fire during the final 15 minutes of the run in and half the men aboard the MLs were either dead or wounded from the intense shelling.

The Campbeltown cleared the estuary and increased speed to drive her bows through the torpedo barrier and into the dock gate. The MLs were all but stopped only two succeeded in landing their full complement of Commandos. Other MLs approached the landing zones but were forced to re-embark their Commandos in the face of very heavy fire from 20mm cannons. On shore fighting was ferocious and close quartered. At 0134 hours Campbeltown was successfully driven at speed into the dock gates just 4 minutes behind schedule and was relieved of most of her crew by MGB 314 while MTB 74 deployed her delayed action torpedoes in the foundations of the old entrance dock gate.
Captain Ryder, CO of the Naval forces went ashore and satisfied himself that Cambeltown was both scuttled and embedded in the lock gate. At 0230 hours Ryder decided to withdraw. By this time more than half of his craft had been destroyed and the remainder were riddled.... if he didn't withdraw soon he would lose them all. The MTB then left for her rendezvous with British destroyers in the open sea off the Loire with 26 men on board accompanied by 7 other craft.. It stopped to pick up two more survivors but was hit by accurate shelling from the shore batteries. Only three of the 34 aboard survived. On the way they met the 5 German torpedo boats returning from their fruitless mission. In further enemy fire more craft were destroyed or scuttled and their crews transferred to the remaining craft. Of the 18 coastal craft which set out from Flalmouth only four returned.

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02 OUTCOME

The delayed action fuses detonated the high explosives in the Cambeltown's hold at noon on the 28th. Forty German officers were aboard at the time and 400 other ranks were nearby on the quay. All were killed in the blast. The dock gates were destroyed and were not repaired until after the war. On the evening of the 29th the delayed torpedoes were activated causing further damage and German casualties. Regrettably many needless French casualties were caused by jittery German soldiers who believed that the raiders were still in their midst.
Of the 241 Commandos who took part 59 were posted as killed or missing and 109 captured. 85 Royal Navy personnel were killed or missing and a further 20+ captured. Many others were wounded. 5 other ranks returned to England via Spain. The Tirptitz was never able to leave Norwegian waters for want of a safe haven on the Atlantic coast. The value of the shipping saved in terms of men, armaments and food, can only be guessed at but it was very significant contribution to the Allied cause.
The fact that the air raid had hindered rather than helped the amphibious raid on St Nazaire had regrettable consequences 5 months later when a planned bombing raid at Dieppe was dispensed with.

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03 AWARDS

Captain Robert Edward Dudley Ryder, RN.
For great gallantry in the attack on St. Nazaire. He commanded a force of small unprotected ships in an attack on a heavily defended port and led HMS Campbeltown in under intense fire from short range weapons at point blank range. Though the main object of the expedition had been accomplished in the beaching of Campbeltown, he remained on the spot conducting operations, evacuating men from Campbeltown and dealing with strong points and close range weapons while exposed to heavy fire for one hour and sixteen minutes, and did not withdraw till it was certain that his ship could be of no use in rescuing any of the Commando Troops who were still ashore. That his motor boat, now full of dead and wounded, should have survived and should have been able to withdraw through an intense barrage of close range fire was almost a miracle.

Lieutenant-Commander Stephen Halden Beattie, RN, HMS Campbeltown.
For great gallantry and determination in the attack on St. Nazaire in command of HMS Campbeltown. Under intense fire directed at the bridge from point blank range of about 100 yards, and in the face of the blinding glare of many searchlights, he steamed her into the lock gates and beached and scuttled her in the correct position. This Victoria Cross is awarded to Lieutenant-Commander Beattie in recognition not only of his own valour but also of that of the unnamed officers and men of a very gallant ship's company, many of whom have not returned.

Able Seaman William Alfred Savage, RN.
For great gallantry, skill and devotion to duty as gun-layer of the pom-pom in a motor gun-boat in the St. Nazaire raid. Completely exposed, and under heavy fire he engaged positions ashore with cool and steady accuracy. On the way out of the harbour he kept up the same vigorous and accurate fire against the attacking ships, until he was killed at his gun. This Victoria Cross is awarded in recognition not only of the gallantry and devotion to duty of Able Seaman Savage, but also of the valour shown by many others, unnamed, in Motor Launches, Motor Gun Boats and Motor Torpedo Boats, who gallantly carried out their duty in entirely exposed positions against enemy fire at very close range.

Sergeant Thomas Frank Durrant, RE
Sergeant Durrant attached to No.1 Commando, was a sergeant in the Royal Engineers. On 27th March 1942 at St Nazaire, he was in charge of a Lewis gun on HM Motor Launch 306 which came under heavy fire during the raid, and although he had no protection and was wounded in several places he continued to fire until the launch was boarded and the survivors were taken prisoner. He died of his wounds the next day.

Lieutenant Colonel Augustus Charles Newman
The Essex Regiment was attached to No.2 Commando. During the St Nazaire raid on 27th March 1942, Lieutenant-Colonel Newman was in charge of the military forces and was one of the first ashore, leading his men and directing operations without regard for his own safety. The troops fought well under his command and held superior numbers of the enemy at bay until the demolition parties had done their jobs. Newman then attempted to fight through into open country and did not surrender until all the ammunition was exhausted when he was then taken prisoner.

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