The Assault on Saint Nazaire
The assault on Saint Nazaire, by British Army Commandos, on the coast of France
(Atlantic coast) is to be considered to be the greatest sea borne raid of
World War II.
The port lies in the mouth of the Loire and had been a major
target for the British, since the occupation of France. It did not only contain
the largest dry dock (at that time) of the world, it was also one of the ,most
important U-Boat bases for the battle of the Atlantic.
On 23 March 1942, a raid was mounted on the dry dock at Saint
Nazaire. Before the Tirpitz, and other German capital ships, could be deployed
against the Allied shipping life-line to the USA and Canada, they needed dry-dock
facilities on the Atlantic coast. The only port capable of handling these
large ships was St. Nazaire on the River Loire estuary. Denying the Germans
the use of the dry-dock at St. Nazaire would effectively neutralize the threat
posed by these formidable fighting ships. In the raid HMS Cambeltown was packed
with high explosives, ran the gauntlet of intensive German gun fire and rammed
into the gates of the dry dock. The losses from those on board, and in accompanying
vessels, was high but it was a supremely successful operation. The damage
to the dry dock was not made good until after the war. No.4 Commando provided
volunteers for the demolition parties.
The outline plan was simple. The selected vessel, packed with
high explosives in the bow, with troops and crew in protected areas, would
ram the outer lock gate at speed and stick there. They would disembark and
take cover behind a nearby air-raid shelter. The ship would then blow up destroying
the gate. An MTB would then pass through and fire specially designed torpedoes
at the inner gate which would collapse under pressure when the tide went out
damaging the submarines berthed in their protected pens. The troops and crew
would then destroy as many dockyard targets and withdraw in fast motor launches
which had followed them in. All this was to be achieved under cover of an
air raid.
The planners themselves had doubts about the withdrawal phase.
There were likely to be unknown and variable factors that could not be planned
for but the risks were less than the potential rewards. However outside the
planning circle there were those, notably the Naval C in C Plymouth, who thought
the vessel would bounce off the gate. He held to his view even against the
advice of the engineer who built it. He also thought that anyone within half
a mile of the explosion would be killed.
Mountbatten conceded the point about the destructive power of the explosion
and delayed action fuses were to be fitted to allow time for the troops and
crew to evacuate the area. However on the question of the use of a boat to
ram the lock gate he held firm. A further concession was to spread the raiding
force between the main ship and the supporting motor launches simply to avoid
total loss of the force in the event of disaster befalling the main ship.
The raid was to be led by HMS Campbeltown, an American lend-lease destroyer
(USS Buchanan). It was especially refitted for the task. Her interior was
stripped, the bridge armour-plated, and additional protection provided for
the Commandos she would carry. The accompanying motor launches (MLs) were
tocarry 150 Commandos. The boats were fitted with two Oerlikon 20mm guns and
additional fuel tanks to increase their range. As the needs of the raid were
reassessed, the ML fleet was firstly increased to ten and then to 14. Only
one motor gun boat (MGB) was available - MGB 314, a C-Class Fairmile, commanded
by Lt. Dunstan Curtis. She would lead the attack and in reserve there would
be motor torpedo boat (MTB) 74. This was equipped with unproven flying torpedoes
to breach the dry dock gates if the Campbeltown failed to reach the target.
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01 ACTION
The fleet sailed from Falmouth at 3 pm on the 26th of March with
MGB 314 at the head and two escort destroyers flanking the MLs and HMS Campbeltown.
South west of Ushant they came across a U-Boat and damaged it. They left the
area of action on a false course which the submarine duly reported to their
command and control HQ. Five German torpedo boats were sent from St Nazaire
to engage the vessels but in entirely the wrong direction. They were still
at sea during the period of the raid. Around midnight on the 26th/27th March
the raiders saw bomb flashes and tracers light the sky. The diversionary bombing
air raid had started but low cloud rendered it inaccurate which caused an
alert in the town and its approaches rather than the intended effect of keeping
the German forces in their bunkers. The bombers had been briefed to target
only specific military installations to avoid civilian casualties. Those who
failed to acquire their targets did not drop their bombs.
Each boat flew the German flag to confuse the enemy and delay
identification. HMS Sturgeon, a submarine, provided the exact position for
the task force from which to make its run into the estuary. The Campbeltown
crept through at 5 knots, touching bottom twice. At 0120 hours search lights
illuminated the entire fleet but, for a short time, the Germans were reluctant
to open fire possibly because of confusion caused by spoof signals and a general
disbelief amongst and the German that such an audacious raid could be undertaken.
The German flags were replaced with the White Ensign when the fleet was still
two miles from its target. The Germans opened fire during the final 15 minutes
of the run in and half the men aboard the MLs were either dead or wounded
from the intense shelling.
The Campbeltown cleared the estuary and increased speed to
drive her bows through the torpedo barrier and into the dock gate. The MLs
were all but stopped only two succeeded in landing their full complement of
Commandos. Other MLs approached
the landing zones but were forced to re-embark their Commandos in the face
of very heavy fire from 20mm cannons. On shore fighting was ferocious and
close quartered. At 0134 hours Campbeltown was successfully driven at speed
into the dock gates just 4 minutes behind schedule and was relieved of most
of her crew by MGB 314 while MTB 74 deployed her delayed action torpedoes
in the foundations of the old entrance dock gate.
Captain Ryder, CO of the Naval forces went ashore and satisfied himself that
Cambeltown was both scuttled and embedded in the lock gate. At 0230 hours
Ryder decided to withdraw. By this time more than half of his craft had been
destroyed and the remainder were riddled.... if he didn't withdraw soon he
would lose them all. The MTB then left for her rendezvous with British destroyers
in the open sea off the Loire with 26 men on board accompanied by 7 other
craft.. It stopped to pick up two more survivors but was hit by accurate shelling
from the shore batteries. Only three of the 34 aboard survived. On the way
they met the 5 German torpedo boats returning from their fruitless mission.
In further enemy fire more craft were destroyed or scuttled and their crews
transferred to the remaining craft. Of the 18 coastal craft which set out
from Flalmouth only four returned.
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02 OUTCOME
The delayed action fuses detonated the high explosives in the
Cambeltown's hold at noon on the 28th. Forty German officers were aboard at
the time and 400 other ranks were nearby on the quay. All were killed in the
blast. The dock gates were destroyed and were not repaired until after the
war. On the evening of the 29th the delayed torpedoes were activated causing
further damage and German casualties. Regrettably many needless French casualties
were caused by jittery German soldiers who believed that the raiders were
still in their midst.
Of the 241 Commandos who took part 59 were posted as killed or missing and
109 captured. 85 Royal Navy personnel were killed or missing and a further
20+ captured. Many others were wounded. 5 other ranks returned to England
via Spain. The Tirptitz was never able to leave Norwegian waters for want
of a safe haven on the Atlantic coast. The value of the shipping saved in
terms of men, armaments and food, can only be guessed at but it was very significant
contribution to the Allied cause.
The fact that the air raid had hindered rather than helped the amphibious
raid on St Nazaire had regrettable consequences 5 months later when a planned
bombing raid at Dieppe was dispensed with.
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03 AWARDS
Captain
Robert Edward Dudley Ryder, RN.
For great gallantry in the attack on St. Nazaire. He commanded a force of
small unprotected ships in an attack on a heavily defended port and led HMS
Campbeltown in under intense fire from short range weapons at point blank
range. Though the main object of the expedition had been accomplished in
the beaching of Campbeltown, he remained on the spot conducting operations,
evacuating men from Campbeltown and dealing with strong points and close
range weapons while exposed to heavy fire for one hour and sixteen minutes,
and did not withdraw till it was certain that his ship could be of no use
in rescuing any of the Commando Troops who were still ashore. That his motor
boat, now full of dead and wounded, should have survived and should have
been able to withdraw through an intense barrage of close range fire was
almost a miracle.
Lieutenant-Commander
Stephen Halden Beattie, RN, HMS Campbeltown.
For great gallantry and determination in the attack on St. Nazaire in command
of HMS Campbeltown. Under intense fire directed at the bridge from point
blank range of about 100 yards, and in the face of the blinding glare of
many searchlights, he steamed her into the lock gates and beached and scuttled
her in the correct position. This Victoria Cross is awarded to Lieutenant-Commander
Beattie in recognition not only of his own valour but also of that of the
unnamed officers and men of a very gallant ship's company, many of whom have
not returned.
Able
Seaman William Alfred Savage, RN.
For great gallantry, skill and devotion to duty as gun-layer of the pom-pom
in a motor gun-boat in the St. Nazaire raid. Completely exposed, and under
heavy fire he engaged positions ashore with cool and steady accuracy. On
the way out of the harbour he kept up the same vigorous and accurate fire
against the attacking ships, until he was killed at his gun. This Victoria
Cross is awarded in recognition not only of the gallantry and devotion to
duty of Able Seaman Savage, but also of the valour shown by many others,
unnamed, in Motor Launches, Motor Gun Boats and Motor Torpedo Boats, who
gallantly carried out their duty in entirely exposed positions against enemy
fire at very close range.
Sergeant
Thomas Frank Durrant, RE
Sergeant Durrant attached to No.1 Commando, was a sergeant in the Royal Engineers.
On 27th March 1942 at St Nazaire, he was in charge of a Lewis gun on HM Motor
Launch 306 which came under heavy fire during the raid, and although he had
no protection and was wounded in several places he continued to fire until
the launch was boarded and the survivors were taken prisoner. He died of
his wounds the next day.
Lieutenant
Colonel Augustus Charles Newman
The Essex Regiment was attached to No.2 Commando. During the St Nazaire raid
on 27th March 1942, Lieutenant-Colonel Newman was in charge of the military
forces and was one of the first ashore, leading his men and directing operations
without regard for his own safety. The troops fought well under his command
and held superior numbers of the enemy at bay until the demolition parties
had done their jobs. Newman then attempted to fight through into open country
and did not surrender until all the ammunition was exhausted when he was
then taken prisoner.
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